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"We die and we live, and nothing destroys us but time."
The Koran, Chap. 45:24
"I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse: therefore choose life
Deuteronomy 31:19
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 Harlin Philip Seritt, Jr. received a sentence of life-without-
parole from the state of Alabama.1 After serving less than two years of a
sentence intended to incarcerate Seritt for the rest of his natural life, he
commented that "I'm not going to sit in here twenty or thirty years. I'd
just as soon be dead. . . . I'd make them shoot me off the fence."2 As
of March 1989 Seritt remained in Alabama's Holman Prison, still serv-
ing time without having attempted an escape.' For Seritt, life-without-
parole means a life of drudgery behind bars, made both secure and dan-
gerous by the knowledge that he has little left to lose.
In 1960 Raymond Eugene Brown killed three of his female rela-
tives. At a time when the only penalty options for a murderer in Ala-
bama were a regular life sentence and death, the jury sentenced the
first-time, fourteen-year old offender to three life terms.4 Consistent
with Alabama's parole statutes, Brown became eligible for parole in
1971 and received it in 1973.' Alabama revoked his parole between 1980
1. See Seritt v. State, 401 So. 2d 248 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981). Seritt was sentenced under
Alabama's Habitual Offender Act, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975), and not as a capital murderer.
While this Note will emphasize life-without-parole as a punishment for murder and not for habit-
ual criminals, Seritt remains a good example of an inmate facing a "natural life" term behind bars.
2. Stewart & Lieberman, What Is This New Sentence That Takes Away Parole?, 11 STU-
DENT LAW. 14, 15 (1982).
3. Interview with Ed Carnes, Assistant Attorney General, State of Alabama (Mar. 7, 1989)
[hereinafter Carnes Interview]. For additional information on Seritt, see Seritt v. Alabama, 731
F.2d 728 (11th Cir.) (upholding the constitutionality of Alabama's habitual offender law mandating
life-without-parole for a trigger offense), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Brown, They're Serv-
ing Life-Without-Parole: Is Punishment Too Cruel for Crimes?, Birmingham News, Dec. 27, 1981,
at 1, col. 1.
4. Foss, Barfoot: Rules Should Prevent Another Brown, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 4,
1988, at 1A, col. 1.
5. See ALA. CODE § 15-22-28(e) (1975). All Alabama inmates except those serving a life-with-
out-parole term are eligible for parole by a majority vote of the Parole Board after serving one-
third or 10 years of their sentences, whichever is less, or by a unanimous vote of the Board at any
time. Id.
[Vol. 43:529
LIFE- WITHOUT-PAROLE
and 1986 because Brown assaulted his landlady, but this "walking time
bomb," who had attacked four women without provocation and mur-
dered three, was released again in 1986.6 In 1988 Alabama convicted
Brown of the brutal stabbing murders of a woman and her nine-year
old daughter and sentenced him to die.' He joins Seritt at Holman
Prison, but he is on Alabama's death row.8
In Brown's case the life-without-parole sanction might have saved
three lives. If Brown had been sentenced to life-without-parole in 1960,
his two 1988 victims likely would be alive, and Brown would not be
facing death or the long, tedious, and expensive process of appealing his
impending execution through the state and federal courts during his
years on death row.9 Neither Seritt nor Brown have particularly attrac-
tive futures, but at least Seritt's punishment is sure and its cost is not
measured in terms of others' lives. The two cases are not atypical of the
present capital sentencing situation in the United States.
The 1972 Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia'° inaugurated a
new era of capital sentencing and punishment in the United States."
By determining that Georgia's imposition of the death penalty was
cruel and unusual because of its capriciousness, the Court left the fed-
eral and state governments with three options for punishing especially
heinous offenders, particularly murderers. 2 First, legislatures could re-
vise capital sentencing statutes to eliminate capriciousness by enacting
procedural safeguards that would enable the laws to pass constitutional
muster. 3 Second, criminal courts could fall back on standard life
sentences, although the ready availability of parole made this alterna-
tive unattractive when perpetrators of especially diabolical crimes
6. Foss, supra note 4, at 2A, col. 1.
7. Id. at 1A, col. 1.
8. Carnes Interview, supra note 3.
9. For an understanding of the long judicial process that awaits new arrivals on any death
row, see generally W. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES
(1984); Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670,
1672-79 (1986); Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038-40 (1989).
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11. For a discussion of this modern era's parameters, see W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
THE EIGHTIES 5-18 (1987).
12. For an analysis of the precise finding in Furman, see Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
SuP. CT. REv. 305, 314-17.
13. Seventeen years after Furman, the federal government and 36 states have adopted this
alternative. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988,
at 4 (1989). The Court sanctioned this approach with its rulings in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) and its companions: Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976). For an example of a statute that uses procedural safeguards such as a bifurcated trial and a
.;pecific listing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203
(1982).
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needed punishment.14 Third, governments could devise another punish-
ment alternative.
This Note will discuss the relatively recent development and cur-
rent prevalence of one alternative: the life sentence without benefit of
parole, commonly called life-without-parole (LWOP). Life-without-pa-
role is the penultimate penalty, meaning in theory the incarceration of
convicts for their natural lives without the possibility of release on pa-
role. In practice, LWOP generally means what it says, although various
states do retain some release mechanisms for LWOP inmates, like exec-
utive commutation or a set term of years. The idea of jailing individuals
for the rest of their lives is at least as old in the Western legal tradition
as the Tower of London or the Bastille. In the United States, however,
such a penalty historically has not been particularly popular. The con-
stitutional system of government in the United States never has al-
lowed persons to be summarily locked away. The American concept of
prisons traditionally has been that they exist for rehabilitation and re-
lease as much as for incarceration.' 5
In the post-Furman era, however, many states specifically have en-
acted life-without-parole punishments to address the problem of espe-
cially dangerous criminals. In many states repeatedly convicted
habitual offenders ultimately receive LWOP sentences. 16 A growing
number of states and the federal government apply LWOP against drug
kingpins and persons trafficking in large amounts of narcotics. 17 The
14. See, e.g., H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 173-74 (3d ed. 1982). For an espe-
cially pointed attack on the abuses of parole that champions life-without-parole, see Brill, Throw
Away the Key, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1987, at 3.
15. The idea that prisons exist to rehabilitate prisoners dates back to the Quakers and the
first American prisons trying to restore "our fellow creatures to virtue and happiness." Alexis de
Tocqueville also observed and recorded this trait of American prisons. See A. TOCQUEVILLE. DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA (1st ed. 1835); Kroll, The Prison Experiment: A Circular History, S. ExxPo-
sURE, Winter 1978, at 6. See generally Andersen, What Are Prisons for?, TIME, Sept. 13, 1982, at
38.
16. Cheatwood, The Life-Without-Parole Sanction: Its Current Status and a Research
Agenda, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 43, 45, 48 (1988). According to Professor Derral Cheatwood, 14 states
currently have some sort of career criminal or habitual offender statute that uses life-without-
parole as its most severe penalty. Id. at 48. Some of these states also use LWOP in capital offender
statutes. Tennessee should be a fifteenth state on this list as its habitual offender statute poten-
tially provides for LWOP, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-806 (1982), however, a federal court order
to diminish overcrowding currently mandates that all Tennessee inmates are eligible for parole
regardless of sentence.
17. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231 (Supp. 1989). Alabama enforces the law. See Foss,
Drug Dealer Faces Life in Prison Without Parole, Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 1, 1988, at 1, col.
1. The federal government also uses life-without-parole in its drug enforcement laws. See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 818 (1982). Specifically, the statute calls for "continuing criminal enterprise" in narcotics
to be punished with a term of imprisonment up to life and that "probation shall not be granted,"
and parole laws shall not be applied. Id. § 848(c); see United States v. McCann, 835 F.2d 1184 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding that a life sentence without possibility of parole imposed upon a defendant
532 [Vol. 43:529
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largest number of states, however, utilize life-without-parole for capital
or first degree murderers as an alternative to capital punishment within
a sentencing scheme or as the death penalty's complete replacement."8
Even though capital punishment has recovered politically since
Furman, life-without-parole continues to emerge as a legitimate alter-
native to capital punishment embraced by either end of the political
spectrum. Even those who favor the death penalty may accept life-with-
out-parole as a means to keep dangerous criminals behind bars."' These
proponents of the death penalty, incited by cases like Alabama's Ray-
mond Brown, would favor LWOP over regular life sentences that pro-
vide parole eligibility. Those who oppose the death penalty, however,
may perceive life-without-parole as harsh or as an invitation to turmoil
by packing felons into crowded prisons without a ready release mecha-
nism, but this view still may acknowledge the sentence as preferable to
capital punishment.20
Despite its popularity, much is unknown about LWOP's ultimate
effects. What will happen when LWOP inmates age in America's pris-
ons and need expensive health care? Will the sanction eventually pro-
duce "super inmates" who respect no authority in or out of prison?
Alternatively, might the penalty merely fulfill its design to punish mur-
derers and permanently protect society from further violence without a
further taking of human life?
This Note begins to analyze these questions by examining the use
of LWOP in capital offender or murder statutes in the United States."
To display LWOP's growing prevalence in the post-Furman era, Part II
traces LWOP's development through the federal and state courts since
1974. Part III presents the tremendously different approaches that
states take in implementing LWOP. Part IV focuses on the specific ap-
proaches taken by Alabama and Kentucky. Part V discusses some spe-
cific advantages and disadvantages of LWOP and investigates LWOP's
convicted under federal law for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise in narcotics was not
cruel or unusual); see also Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a life-
without-parole sentence for a first offender of Michigan's stringent drug laws was not cruel or
unusual).
18. As of March 1990, 30 states have some sort of life-without-parole as a possible punish-
ment for murder. See infra notes 66-125 and accompanying text.
19. Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2, at 16. Assistant Alabama Attorney General Ed
Carnes reiterated in 1989 the views he expressed in this article. Carnes Interview, supra note 3.
20. See Lieberman & Stewart, Life Without Parole Successful in 19 Other States, Atlanta
Const., Feb. 15, 1982, at 7A, col. 7 (quoting Mr. Laughlin McDonald, Director, Southeastern Re-
gional Office, American Civil Liberties Union); see also Medland & Fischer, Life Without Parole
Offered As Alternative to Death Penalty, CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., Jan. 16, 1990, at 4-5.
21. While discussion of the other uses of LWOP, such as for habitual offenders or drug traf-
fickers, may enter tangentially into this Note especially in Part II, this Note's primary focus is
LWOP in capital murder statutes.
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future implications for American penal systems. Part VI weighs the
positive and negative elements of LWOP and some of its specific appli-
cations. Additionally, Part VI attempts to provide guidance both to
states that already use LWOP and wish to promote its continued suc-
cess, and to states like Tennessee 21 that do not have LWOP but may
consider adopting the sanction.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRECEDENT FOR LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE
A. Constitutionality in Federal Courts
The idea of punishing certain murderers with imprisonment for
their natural lives is hardly new. Prior to 1974, however, little evidence
documented its widespread use. s With the apparent need to develop
alternatives to the death penalty after Furman, life-without-parole re-
ceived increased attention from lawmakers and judges. The Supreme
Court sanctioned this interest in the 1974 case of Schick v. Reed.2
1. Schick v. Reed
In Schick a former Army master sergeant originally had been sen-
tenced to die for killing an eight-year old girl.25 President Dwight D.
Eisenhower commuted the sentence in 1960 to life imprisonment, at-
taching the condition that Schick would never be eligible for parole.26
Schick brought suit in 1971 in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to require the United States Board of Parole to
consider him for parole despite President Eisenhower's attached condi-
tion to Schick's sentence. Schick argued that President Eisenhower had
22. The original impetus for this Note came from Professor Donald J. Hall of the Vanderbilt
University School of Law, a member of the Tennessee Sentencing Commission. Professor Hall and
several state legislators in Nashville have stated that Tennessee may consider adding LWOP to its
capital offender statute in the future. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203 (1982).
23. New York, for example, had a natural life sentencing provision prior to 1960, but in keep-
ing with the national trend shifted to an indeterminate sentencing scheme in 1960 that provided
regular life as the maximum penalty for murder. N.Y. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVS., LIFE WITH-
OUT PAROLE STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1984) (available now from the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund and on file with the Author). Currently, New York has neither life-without-parole
nor the death penalty for murderers. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1987). New York
designates both first and second degree murder as class A-1 felonies and punishes them with
mandatory indeterminate sentences ranging from 15 to 25 years to regular life. An inmate serving
such an indeterminate sentence must serve the minimum sentence, up to 25 years, before being
eligible for parole. Id. § 70.40(1)(a).
For examples of older cases involving life-without-parole as a punishment for murder, see
Green v. Teets, 244 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Ragen, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945); and State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960).
24. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
25. Id. at 257.
26. Id. at 257-58. The President's constitutional authority to pardon persons for crimes in-
cludes the power to commute sentences. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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exceeded his article II commutation powers in attaching the stipulation,
and in the alternative, that Furman rendered Schick's original sentence
void and the harshest sentence that could have been applied to him was
a life sentence that provided for the possibility of parole.27
The majority rejected Schick's claims and affirmed the constitu-
tional power of the Chief Executive to pardon criminals and commute
sentences .2 Determinative in the case was the Court's conclusion that
the President's powers of pardoning and commutation are derived
solely from the Constitution and cannot be diminished, modified, or
abridged by statutes or the Court's holding in Furman. Schick's sen-
tence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole was given only cur-
sory mention.29
The Court stated that the no-parole condition on the commutation
of Schick's death sentence is similar to sanctions such as mandatory
minimum sentences or statutes otherwise precluding parole. The Court
also stated that this condition does not offend the Constitution.0 With
little analysis in a case actually dealing with the scope of the Presi-
dent's power, the Court effectively dismissed any notion that life-with-
out-parole was unconstitutional. Less than two years earlier, all nine
Justices had written opinions on whether the death penalty was in any
way cruel or unusual, but none seemed to consider that those adjectives
might apply to a sentence of life-without-parole.3 1
2. Subsequent Cases
Despite Schick's lack of thorough analysis regarding LWOP, an im-
posing amount of precedent has developed based upon Schick. In 1977
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted Schick
in Moore v. Cowan.2 Relying on language from Schick, the Sixth Cir-
cuit rejected the argument that life-without-parole constituted cruel
and unusual punishment and affirmed the sentence against a rapist, not
27. Schick, 419 U.S. at 259. Furman was decided during the course of Schick's litigation.
Inmates sentenced to death row prior to Furman who were still alive had their sentences set aside
after Furman in favor of life sentences that allowed for the possibility of parole. Under such a
scheme, Schick would have been eligible for parole in 1969. Id. at 258.
28. Id. at 266-67.
29. Id. at 267.
30. Id. Justice Warren Burger did cite several "sanctions imposed by legislatures" that in-
cluded specific mentions of life-without-parole, including 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1982); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 1970); and NEv. REv. STAT. §200.030 (1973). Id. at n.7.
31. Even Justice Thurgood Marshall's spirited dissent concentrated only on the issues of
whether Furman should be applied retroactively and whether the President overstepped his con-
stitutional power in imposing any kind of sentencing condition. See id. at 268-80 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
32. 560 F.2d 1298 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929 (1978).
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a murderer, in Kentucky.38 The court claimed that it was bound to ap-
ply the rationale of Schick, but Schick hardly provided a deterministic
rationale. It provided at best a boilerplate ruling, language easily
quoted but supported by little substantive analysis.
In 1979 the Third Circuit again applied Schick in Government of
Virgin Islands v. Gereau"4 A murderer in St. Croix received eight con-
secutive life terms after conviction for eight separate murders and re-
lated crimes.35 The defendant argued that the punishment was cruel
and unusual because the sentence's sheer length precluded any oppor-
tunity for parole and thus eliminated any incentive for rehabilitation. 6
The court rejected this argument and held that Schick mandates that a
legislature may authorize, and a court may impose, a term of imprison-
ment that precludes the possibility for parole.
3 7
In 1980 the Eighth Circuit held that Arkansas's imposition of life-
without-parole on a convicted rapist was not cruel and unusual in Brit-
ton v. Rogers.35 The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Rummel v. Estele,3 9 which held that the length of prison
sentences generally falls within the states' discretion.4 e The result re-
mained the same, however, and life-without-parole stood as a permissi-
ble punishment for rape in an additional circuit.
Also in 1980 the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Valenzuela
41
sanctioned the use of life-without-parole to punish individuals engaged
in continuing criminal enterprises in narcotics. The court upheld the
sentencing provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 that prohibited probation or parole for anyone sen-
tenced under the Act.4 The court quoted from both Rummel and
Schick in categorically rejecting the contention that life-without-parole
in any way violated the eighth amendment.43
33. Id. at 1303. The court even acknowledged that the precise question raised in Moore,
whether LWOP is cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment was not addressed in
Schick, but applied the precedent anyway. Id.
34. 592 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 192-93.
36. Id. at 195.
37. Id.
38. 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980).
39. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding a Texas recidivist statute calling for mandatory life im-
prisonment for all third felony convictions of a person even if the third felony had been obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses). Rummel applied the Furman proportionality standard in holding that
sentences like LWOP or regular life could not be disproportionate to the crimes being punished,
but allowed for several factors to be figured into the proportionality equation. Id. at 271-75.
40. Britton, 631 F.2d at 578.
41. 646 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1980).
42. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d at 354; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1982).
43. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d at 354. In this case the defendant had been convicted of nine
counts of conspiracy, narcotics, and continuing criminal enterprise. Id. at 353. The Schick "ration-
[Vol. 43:529536
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United States v. O'DriscolI4" a 1985 case involving a three hun-
dred year sentence with no possibility of parole for ninety-nine years,
provided the Tenth Circuit with the opportunity to state definitively
the federal courts' support of the constitutionality of life-without-parole
penalties. The court cited Schick and Gereau in upholding the sentence
imposed on a notorious kidnapper, but went further in proclaiming that
retribution and rehabilitation are equally permissible goals of incarcera-
tion.45 While acknowledging that sentences could not be disproportion-
ate to the severity of the crime, the court maintained that a severe
penalty is permissible to account for the "vicious propensities of the
defendant and his lack of. . . respect for human life." ' By definition
murderers show a lack of respect for human life, and the federal courts
never seem to have questioned that life-without-parole penalties consti-
tutionally may be imposed against them.
This acceptance of life-without-parole's fundamental constitution-
ality has spawned a variety of other constitutional issues, including
proper jury instructions for sentencing murderers to life-without-pa-
role47 and how best to punish inmates who murder again while serving a
ale" emerged again in 1981 when a district court held that the imposition of five consecutive life
sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Dean v. Israel, 516 F. Supp. 477
(E.D. Wis. 1981). Dean had been convicted of five counts of first degree murder, and on appeal,
specifically argued that his sentence precluded him from parole eligibility for a period in excess of
50 years, almost certainly the extent of his natural life, and as such was cruel and unusual. Id. at
492-93. The court rejected the argument, again quoting the specific "does not offend the Constitu-
tion" language of Schick and offering no additional analysis. Id. at 493. In a string cite that in-
cluded Moore, Gereau, and Rummel the court referred to Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir.
1978), in which specific standards for proportionality were outlined, but the court did not explain
how the test applied in the instant case. See Dean, 516 F. Supp. at 493; see also Carmona, 576
F.2d at 414.
44. 761 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986).
45. Id. at 599. The court considered O'Driscoll to be a particularly vile criminal based on his
long record of violent crime and the heinousness of the instant offense. Id. at 591-94; see Atiyeh v.
Capps, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981) (holding that incarceration can be used
purely for reasons of retribution).
46. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d at 600. But see United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1988) (refusing to allow a district court to postpone eligibility for parole beyond the statutorily
provided 10 years in a murder case).
47. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (holding that a trial judge may inform a
jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may be commuted by
the governor to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole; the so-called "Briggs Instruction"
in California). For more on governors' abilities to commute life-without-parole sentences, see infra
note 141 and accompanying text; and Martin, Commutation of Prison Sentences: Practice, Prom-
ise, and Limitation, 29 CRim & DmINQ. 593 (1983).
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that the Illinois pattern instructions to a death qualified
jury must state that in the alternative to the death penalty (1) a natural life sentence will be
imposed, (2) natural life does not allow for parole except in cases of executive clemency, and (3)
such clemency is possible. See People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 262, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1165-66
(1988).
The entire issue of how much death qualified jurors should be allowed or expected to know
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life-without-parole sentence.4 More precise understandings of propor-
tionality also are being defined, but this issue applies more to habitual
offender statutes than to capital murder statutes.49 Underlying all of
this judicial discussion, however, is the basic judgment reached so
quickly in Schick that life-without-parole sentences are not unconstitu-
tional. At the federal level, this issue may never have been argued thor-
oughly, but it has been decided definitively.
B. Application in State Courts
State courts readily apply life-without-parole sentences, particu-
larly in murder cases, and often provide the kind of detailed analysis
lacking in the federal cases. In 1977, for example, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court upheld a trial judge's reduction of a penalty of death to
life imprisonment without parole in Collins v. State.50 The Arkansas
Supreme Court noted that the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual
punishment applies against a punishment's character and not its
duration."
The New Hampshire Supreme Court provided an excellent analysis
on the constitutionality and application of life-without-parole in State
v. Farrow.5 2 The two defendants stabbed to death a mentally handi-
capped victim and were sentenced to life-without-parole.53 On appeal
the defendants argued that the punishment was cruel and unusual both
as disproportionate to the crime and as not comporting with basic con-
cepts of human dignity. 4 The court rejected both arguments, the first
about parole is unsettled. See, e.g., King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'g
828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1987). This issue is of special concern to convicted murderers sitting before
jurors whose uncertainty about a state's parole laws may lead them to impose death rather than
run the risk that the murderer will one day be released from prison. See Paduano & Smith,
Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty,
18 COLUM. HuiM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1987). This specific issue has been raised in Tennessee. See
State v. Johnson, 698 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1985) (holding that a trial court need not explain parole
laws in response to a death qualified juror's question).
48. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding that a mandatory death sentence for
an inmate already serving life-without-parole who killed another inmate was unconstitutional).
49. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding unconstitutional as disproportion-
ate a life-without-parole sentence for a habitual offender convicted of uttering a "no account"
check for $100). But see State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987) (holding that a life-
without-parole sentence for a habitual offender convicted of housebreaking was constitutionally
proportionate).
50. 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977). In Arkansas a trial judge may reduce punishments
to lower degrees of homicide in capital cases when evidence is insufficient to support a higher
degree of homicide.
51. Id. at 213-14, 548 S.W.2d at 117. The court mentioned Schick only at the very end of the
case. Id. at 222, 548 S.W.2d at 121.
52. 118 N.H. 296, 386 A.2d 808 (1978).
53. Id. at 299-300, 386 A.2d at 810.
54. Id. at 302-04, 386 A.2d at 812-13.
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because LWOP met the "acceptable according to contemporary stan-
dards" standard of Gregg v. Georgia.5
The second argument failed because the court did not accept the
defendants' contentions that LWOP made the defendants "caged ani-
mals," subject to "ultimate degradation unsurpassed in enormity.""6
Rather, the court maintained that the penalty allowed the defendants
to seek educational and vocational training within prison and held out
the hope that good behavior ultimately would result in an executive
pardon or commutation.57 However bleak the future of an inmate sen-
tenced to life-without-parole may be, it is arguably superior to that of
an inmate on death row and may better comport with basic concepts of
human dignity than capital punishment.
For the past eleven years, the arguments developed in Farrow gen-
erally have been accepted. In Bangert v. State,55 for example, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that multiple consecutive life sentences
could be no more harsh than a life-without-parole sentence and stated
that because LWOP was constitutional, so was the defendant's specific
sentence. The court stressed that such sentences serve the valid legisla-
tive purpose of protecting the public.5 9
When applying the Illinois "natural life imprisonment" sentence,
Illinois courts also have stressed the state's prerogative to consider an
accused's rehabilitative potential.60 Aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances such as the accused's criminal record, state of mental health,
habits, demeanor, and age, as well as the specific details of the instant
crime must be considered by a sentencing authority, but when these
factors are weighed properly within the bounds of reason, life-without-
parole sentences are routinely upheld. 1 The Illinois courts also specifi-
cally consider that executive clemency may be invoked on behalf of an
inmate serving a natural life sentence, but this possibility is never an
adequate substitute for a sentencing judge's thoughtful consideration of
55. Id. at 302, 386 A.2d at 812; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976). The New
Hampshire court also rejected the notion that parole was any sort of substantive due process right
under the Constitution. See Farrow, 118 N.H. at 301-02, 386 A.2d at 811-12; see also Note, Parole
Rescission: Is Parole a Constitutionally Protectable Expectation of an Inmate?, 5 GEo. MASON
U.L. REv. 303 (1982).
56. Farrow, 118 N.H. at 303, 386 A.2d at 812-13.
57. Id. at 304, 386 A.2d at 813.
58. 282 N.W.2d 540, 546 (Minn. 1979).
59. Id.
60. See People v. Smith, 91 IM. App. 3d 438, 449, 414 N.E.2d 1281, 1291-92 (1980), rev'd, 93
Ill. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982).
61. See People v. Withers, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1088-91, 450 N.E.2d 1323, 1331-33 (1983)
(upholding a life-without-parole sentence). But see People v. Taylor, 115 Ill. App. 3d 621, 624-27,
630, 450 N.E.2d 1256, 1258-60, 1263 (1983) (remanding a case when a sentencing judge had not
properly weighed factors), modified, 102 IM. 2d 201, 464 N.E.2d 1059 (Ct. App. 1984).
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a defendant's rehabilitative potential.62
Missouri adopts the Farrow rationale in its entirety. In State v.
Olinghouse6 s the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argu-
ment that a life sentence without possibility of parole for fifty years was
cruel and unusual punishment by quoting at length from Farrow.4 The
state's interest in protecting its citizens, the legislature's authority to
determine that certain heinous crimes merit life-without-parole, and
the opportunity for convicted murderers to reform themselves in prison
and still be released through commutation or pardon swayed the court
to enforce life-without-parole as a constitutional alternative to capital
punishment.
While these cases do not exhaust the various findings of state
courts on life-without-parole, 5 they are representative of state court
approaches for judicially justifying and sanctioning life-without-parole
sentences as an alternative to the death penalty. The cases discussed,
however, do not suggest the multiple ways that states implement or use
the life-without-parole alternative. For an understanding of this com-
plex topic, a complete survey and categorization of the states' alterna-
tives is necessary.
III. DIFFERING VERSIONS OF LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE AND THEIR USE BY
THE STATES
At least thirty states use life-without-parole in some form as the
actual or possible sentence for convictions of the type of murder that
each state deems most serious.6 6 None of these states, however, use life-
without-parole in exactly the same form. For purposes of comparison,
the different types of life-without-parole used by the states can be
placed in six categories, each of which will be examined in turn: (1) a
triple tiered approach in which a murderer may be sentenced to death,
LWOP, or regular life; 7 (2) a triple tiered approach in which the op-
62. See Withers, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 1088-90, 450 N.E.2d at 1331-32; Taylor, 115 Il1. App. 3d
at 627-28, 450 N.E.2d at 1261.
63. 605 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (upholding a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole for a capital murderer).
64. See id. at 63-65.
65. For further examples of state cases dealing with life-without-parole, see State v. Parle,
110 Ariz. 517, 521 P.2d 604, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974); Duhart v. State, 237 Ga. 426, 228
S.E.2d 822 (1976); People v. Hall, 396 Mich. 650, 242 N.W.2d 377 (1976); and State v. Forrester, 21
Wash. App. 855, 587 P.2d 179 (1978).
66. For example, Maryland may impose LWOP for what it classifies as first degree murder.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1987). Washington can impose the penalty for aggravated first
degree murder. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (Supp. 1989). Arkansas imposes the penalty
for persons convicted of what it calls capital murder. See AR. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-602 (1987). All are
different names for essentially the same offense.
67. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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tions are death, LWOP for a set minimum of years, or regular life;68 (3)
a double tiered approach in which the options are death or LWOP;69 (4)
a double tiered approach in which the options are death or LWOP for a
term of years;70 (5) a double tiered approach in which the sentencer
may choose only between LWOP or regular life;71 and (6) a single tiered
approach in which LWOP is the only available sentence.72
A. Triple Tiered Approach
Only five states utilize the triple tiered approach in any form, and
most of these only recently have adopted life-without-parole statutes
for murderers. Maryland provides perhaps the best example of this ap-
proach, specifying that a person convicted of murder in the first degree
"shall be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole. '7 3 Depending upon the circum-
stances of the trial, a jury or a judge determines the sentence in the
second stage of a bifurcated proceeding.7 4 The sentencer weighs aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, considers the notice the prosecu-
tion gave about the sentence being sought, and sentences the
defendant.75 The current Maryland system has been in place only since
1987.
The Oklahoma statute mirrors Maryland's in intent and practice,
but has been in effect only since 1988. Montana effectively uses a
triple tiered approach because of a provision that allows a sentencing
court to deny a defendant eligibility for parole while serving any sen-
tence for a term of more than one year.77 This denial applies to all
sentences for murder if the court does not choose the death penalty.
Nevada's approach is similar to Montana's in that a sentencing body
may impose life imprisonment or capital punishment for first degree
murder, and can specify whether imprisonment is with or without the
possibility of parole.78
The State of Washington also uses a type of triple tiered sentenc-
ing scheme. First degree murder in Washington is punishable by a regu-
68. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (1987).
74. Id. § 413(b).
75. Id. § 413(h), (k).
76. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (Supp. 1988). But see Costa v. State, 753 P.2d 393
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202(2) (1989); see also id. § 46-23-201(1).
78. NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(4) (1984).
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
lar life sentence,7 but the presence of aggravating circumstances will
enable a jury to impose life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
role.80 Further, a defendant may face a third type of sentence if the
prosecution files a timely motion for a special sentencing proceeding.
This special proceeding may warrant the imposition of the death pen-
alty if sufficient aggravating circumstances exist."1 In all five states the
possibility exists that a person accused of murder may go to trial and
still receive any one of three possible sentences.
B. Triple Tiered Approach with a Set Minimum of Years
A life-without-parole sentence that provides for a set minimum of
years seems to be a contradiction in terms. The sentence is designed,
however, to ensure that a defendant will remain in prison for a lengthy
term of years (usually at least twenty), during which time the defend-
ant is not eligible for parole. After completing the minimum term of
years, normal parole eligibility resumes. Unlike a regular life sentence,
the sentence provides incarceration for murder for a guaranteed
amount of time that is generally much longer than what the criminal
would serve under a regular life sentence with the state's normal parole
scheme. A variety of states use this alternative in sentencing murder-
ers, 82 but only Kentucky uses it in a triple tiered approach.
In Kentucky if a jury finds a defendant guilty of a capital offense,
the jury after a presentencing hearing may recommend a sentence of
death, or imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole
until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five years
(LWOP-25), or a sentence of life."3 The sentence imposed again is de-
termined by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but
79. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.040 (1988).
80. Id. § 10.95.030 (Supp. 1989); see also State v. Hughes, 106 Wash. 2d 176, 721 P.2d 902
(1986) (en bane) (upholding constitutionality of the mandatory imposition of LWOP when the
defendant had killed a police officer).
81. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.030(2), .050 (Supp. 1989).
82. See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
83. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.030(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985). Actually Kentucky pro-
vides for a fourth alternative, a term of not less than twenty years in a "quadruple tiered" ap-
proach. Id. §§ 532.030(1), (4). This last alternative, however, apparently is not used often in capital
cases. Telephone Interview with Oleh Tustaniwsky, Esq., Department of Public Advocacy, Com-
monwealth of Kentucky (Sept. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Tustaniwsky Interview]. The passage of Ken-
tucky's Truth in Sentencing Act in 1986 eventually may make a term of years alternative more
popular with jurors than even LWOP-25. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill Supp. 1988). The legislation mandates that murderers and other violent offenders serve at least
50% of the terms of years imposed against them before becoming eligible for parole. Id. §
439.3401(3). Thus, a murderer sentenced to a term of 100 years must serve 50 years (not just 25)
before being considered for release by the Parole Board. For more on the development of this
sanction in Kentucky, see infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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whatever .the jury's recommendation, the judge makes the ultimate sen-
tencing decision. 4
C. Double Tiered Approach
Most states that use life-without-parole in capital offender statutes
utilize a double tiered approach in which sentencers decide only be-
tween imposing the death penalty or LWOP in the severest murder
cases. Among the sixteen states that use the double tiered approach,
twelve expressly authorize the penalty in the criminal, penal, or sen-
tencing portions of their state statutes,8 5 while four acknowledge the
sentence in parole statutes that bar from parole eligibility either all per-
sons serving life sentences or those serving life sentences for murder. 6
Alabama illustrates the approach taken by the twelve states that
clearly identify life-without-parole as an option in their sentencing stat-
utes. At the capital sentencing stage of an Alabama trial, the jury rec-
ommends an advisory sentence of death or life imprisonment without
parole based on a weighing of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.8 7 If aggravating circumstances predominate, the jury recom-
mends death; if not, the jury recommends LWOP. No other alternative
is available.8
Arkansas follows the same system, stipulating that as an alterna-
tive to the death penalty, capital murder shall be punishable by life
imprisonment without parole. 9 Other states using very similar systems
include California,9" Delaware,9 Louisiana,92 Missouri,93 Nebraska,94
84. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). For addi-
tional information on Kentucky's use of life-without-parole for 25 years, see infra notes 143-62 and
accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(a) (1987). The statute states that "[a]ny person
who is convicted of first-degree murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for the
remainder of his or her natural life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction
." Id.
86. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1988). This statute merely states that "[a]
person sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and pa-
roles." Id.
87. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1975).
88. The judge actually determines and pronounces the sentence, and the jury's advisory ver-
dict of LWOP must be reached by a majority of jurors. Id. §§ 13A-5-46(f), -47(a); see also infra
notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
89. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-601(b)(1) (1981).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1978) (providing a more general list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances).
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4209(a) (1987).
92. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1988) (stating that if a jury unanimously
finds a death penalty inappropriate, it must recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence).
93. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.020.2 (Supp. 1988) (specifically designating only death and LWOP
as the punishment alternatives for first degree murder); see also State v. Eggers, 675 S.W.2d 923
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and New Hampshire.95
Four other states employ a substantially modified double tiered ap-
proach codified in their sentencing statutes. Illinois allows for a sen-
tence of natural life imprisonment in the alternative to capital
punishment in cases in which the murder was accompanied by "excep-
tionally brutal or heinous behavior," or other aggravating circum-
stances, or in which the defendant already had been convicted of first
degree murder in any jurisdiction."6 In Connecticut life-without-parole
is used only in capital cases in which the death penalty is not im-
posed. Idaho punishes murder in the first degree with death or life
imprisonment, but stipulates that with a life sentence the court must
establish a minimum time to be served without eligibility for parole.
That minimum may be the prisoner's natural life.98 Vermont uses a sys-
tem very similar to Idaho's 9
Four states effectively use a double tiered approach, although ju-
rors may or may not know that they are choosing between the death
penalty and LWOP or death and a regular life sentence. This uncer-
tainty stems from a lack of express provision for LWOP in the states'
criminal, penal, or sentencing statutes, and the unsettled state of the
law concerning the permissible breadth of knowledge or information
concerning parole to be given to death qualified jurors.100 In Wyoming,
for example, a person convicted of murder in the first degree is punish-
able by death or life imprisonment.10 1 Wyoming parole law then pro-
vides that the parole board may not grant parole to a person
imprisoned under a life sentence.10 The other states using this or a
similar scheme include South Dakota,103  Virginia,104  and
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
94. See NEB. RE v. STAT. §§ 28-105, -303, 29-2520 to -2524 (1977) (outlining the procedure,
categories, and penalties for murder in the first degree).
95. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(V) (1982) (stating that a judge may impose LWOP when a
jury cannot agree on a punishment within a reasonable time).
96. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-1 (Supp. 1988). In a normal first degree murder trial
in Illinois the jury may choose between a term of 20 to 60 years or natural life. Id.; see also supra
notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
97. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-35b, -46a(f) (1985). Generally life imprisonment in Con-
necticut means a definite sentence of 60 years except when applied in a capital case, when it means
natural life or life-without-parole. Id. § 53a-35b.
98. IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1987) (requiring that the minimum term must be at least 10
years and may be life).
99. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(a) (1988) (requiring that Vermont's minimum term
must be at least 35 years and may include life-without-parole).
100. See supra note 47.
101. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-101(b) (1988).
102. Id. § 7-13-402(a).
103. See supra note 86.
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(B1) (1987) (stating that only if the defendant has two other
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Pennsylvania.10 5
D. Double Tiered Approach with Varying Terms of Years
A large number of states use a double tiered approach that actually
does not involve a true life-without-parole sanction. Rather, as in Ken-
tucky, murderers convicted and sentenced under the states' capital sen-
tencing schemes may receive the death penalty or a life sentence for
which a minimum term of years must be served before parole eligibility
begins. For example, in Arizona a person guilty of first degree murder
will suffer death or imprisonment for life without the possibility of pa-
role until the prisoner has served twenty-five calendar years. 0 6 Other
states using a very similar approach include Colorado,' Florida,0 8
New Jersey,'0 9 North Carolina,"'0 Ohio,"' and Oregon." 2 Tennessee also
falls within this category, although its severe prison overcrowding prob-
lem causes the term of years to be served under a Tennessee life sen-
tence to fluctuate." 3
felony convictions of any sort will the defendant be ineligible for parole).
105. 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 331.21 (Purdon 1984). Recent Pennsylvania laws against first
degree murder in conjunction with arson specifically have set up a sentence of life imprisonment
without right to parole despite the fact that all persons serving a life sentence in Pennsylvania are
ineligible for parole anyway. See 18 id. § 3301(b).
106. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A) (1987).
107. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(1) (1986) (allowing death or LWOP for 20 years for of-
fenses committed before July 1, 1985, and death or LWOP for 40 years for offenses committed
after July 1, 1985).
108. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1978) (allowing death or LWOP for 25 years). The Florida Leg-
islature passed a triple tiered sentencing scheme that included life-without-parole in the summer
of 1989, but Governor Bob Martinez vetoed the measure.
109. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3(b) (1981) (allowing death or LWOP for 30 years).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(al) (1984) (allowing death or LWOP for 20 years).
111. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(A) (Anderson 1986) (allowing death or LWOP for 20
years).
112. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105 (1987) (allowing death or LWOP for up to 30 years).
113. In Tennessee first degree murder is punished by "death or imprisonment for life." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-202(b) (1982 & Supp. 1988). Tennessee's life sentence statutes provide that an
inmate serving a life sentence may become eligible for parole after 30 calendar years. Id. § 40-28-
116(a)(2). This 30-year term can be reduced by no more than 35% for inmates sentenced to crimes
committed before 1988 and no more than 30% for crimes committed during and after 1988. Id. §
41-21-236(i) (Supp. 1988). In addition, the Parole Board in its discretion could consider an inmate
for early release of up to 35% of the inmate's term (as of Nov. 1, 1989) prior to the regularly
scheduled release eligibility date under the current emergency measures authorized by TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-1-504 to -510 (mandated by federal court order and implemented by ever changing
Governor's directives) to reduce prison overcrowding. Not taking into consideration possible emer-
gency release and assuming that the inmate maximized the credits available by exemplary behav-
ior, the time to be served on a life sentence in Tennessee is either 19 /2 years or 21 years before
parole eligibility, depending upon when the offense was committed. Furthermore, that an inmate
has accrued enough prison time to be eligible for regular parole release, of course, does not mean
that the inmate actually will be released. Release is discretionary within the Parole Board's au-
thority. In addition, according to the last Governor's directive of Sept. 29, 1989, no persons con-
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At least two other states use a similar scheme but with a modifica-
tion that merits special attention. In Indiana a person who commits
murder may be put to death, but in the alternative that person may be
imprisoned for a fixed term of forty years, with up to twenty years
added because of aggravating circumstances, and up to ten years de-
ducted for mitigating circumstances. 114 Thus, the LWOP fixed term al-
ternative may range between thirty and sixty years.
In South Carolina murderers may be punished by death or by im-
prisonment for life-without-parole for twenty years or thirty years if
special circumstances exist.115 More importantly the South Carolina
statute specifically provides that if the Governor commutes a death sen-
tence, as allowed under the South Carolina Constitution, the commutee
must serve the life sentence without being eligible for parole.111 A mur-
derer sentenced to die in South Carolina never legally should be re-
leased again. For purposes of counting which states employ a form of
true or natural life-without-parole as an alternative to capital punish-
ment, only South Carolina was counted from the states discussed in this
section.
E. Double Tiered Approach Without a Death Penalty
Fourteen states currently do not have capital punishment, and
among these, only three provide for a double tiered approach that gives
sentencers a choice in punishing first degree murderers. In effect,
Rhode Island and West Virginia provide for sentencers to determine
whether life sentences should be imposed with or without the possibil-
ity of parole. Rhode Island authorizes a regular life sentence, but allows
victed of first degree murder (or second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated
assault, assault with intent to commit murder, or escape when the sentence is more than one year)
can be given the benefit of the emergency measures. A death qualified juror sentencing a murderer
in Tennessee may or may not be aware of the factors affecting Tennessee's "regular" life sentence,
or that Tennessee has executed no murderers since 1962. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
For a background view of Tennessee's prison overcrowding problems, see Grubbs v. Bradley,
552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); see also Groseclose v. Dutton, 788 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1986)
(applying the Grubbs decision to the conditions of Tennessee's death row inmates).
114. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3(a) (Burns 1982). This law came into effect in 1977. Prior to
that time Indiana courts did not necessarily recognize any difference between a "life" sentence and
a "natural life" sentence for murder, even though the old statute called for only a "life" sentence
and allowed for parole eligibility. See Lock v. State, 273 Ind. 315, 329, 403 N.E.2d 1360, 1370
(1980) (holding that the two terms could not be construed to mean different things). Fortunately
this case appears to be only an aberration under prior law.
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 1983). LWOP for 30 years is allowed when the
state seeks the death penalty in a case and aggravating circumstances are found to exist, but the
jury still does not recommend the death penalty. Id.
116. Id.; see also S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
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the court.to designate that the inmate will not be eligible for parole." 7
West Virginia gives a presumption to an automatic life-without-parole
sentence, but allows that the jury may recommend that the convicted
person be eligible for parole."18 Maine punishes murderers with either
life or a term of years not to be less than twenty-five. 119 The state's
parole laws specifically remove from eligibility for parole or uncondi-
tional discharge any person serving a life sentence for murder.2 0
F. Single Tiered Approach
By various means, four states imprison their most serious murder-
ers with only life-without-parole, whatever the circumstances. Hawaii's
statute clearly provides that persons convicted of first degree murder or
first degree attempted murder shall receive life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. 1 1 Iowa punishes first degree murder as a "Class
A" felony with incarceration "for the rest of the defendant's life.'
122
The law further states that no person convicted of such a felony may be
released on parole from the mandatory life sentence without commuta-
tion by the governor. 23
Massachusetts previously employed a double tiered system, but
with the repeal of the state's death penalty mechanisms in 1982, it now
punishes first degree murderers with only life imprisonment. Massachu-
setts provides that no person shall be eligible for parole while serving a
life sentence for first degree murder. 24 Michigan also exempts from pa-
role eligibility prisoners sentenced to life for first degree murder.125
Whether in sentencing statutes or parole provisions, these states effec-
tively require convicted murderers literally to face life behind bars.
IV. SPECIFIC APPLICATION AND EXPERIENCE IN Two STATES
Merely to catalog the various state approaches in implementing
life-without-parole in capital offender statutes does not explain ade-
quately the several issues associated with LWOP. Why did states im-
117. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (1978).
118. W. VA. CODE § 62-3-15 (1984).
119. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (1978).
120. Id. § 1201(A).
121. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656(1) (1980).
122. IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 1979).
123. Id.
124. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West Supp. 1989). Executive clemency remains a
possibility in Massachusetts. Id.
125. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.234(4) (West 1979). Formerly Michigan courts also con-
sidered the "natural" in natural life to be "mere surplusage." People v. Rowls, 28 Mich. App. 190,
184 N.W.2d 332 (1970). But see People v. Cohens, 111 Mich. App. 788, 314 N.W.2d 756 (1981)
(holding that a life sentence rendered a defendant ineligible for parole).
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plement life-without-parole? How has LWOP affected the criminal
justice and corrections systems in these states? What are the intended
effects and actual ends of the legislatures and courts that have passed
and imposed LWOP? No definitive answers exist to these questions,
but qualified observations can be made based on the experiences of the
various states. Parts IV and V of this Note address these questions re-
spectively by examining two states' experiences with life-without-pa-
role, and the general effects and problems that seem to be associated
with the sentence.
A. Alabama's Double Tiered Approach
In Alabama life-without-parole originated as an option in capital
cases in the early 1970s, resulting from general public dissatisfaction
with murderers serving "life" terms and leaving prison early on pa-
role. 126 No specific, egregious incident sparked the Alabama legislature's
adoption of life-without-parole. Rather, a general attitude of frustration
toward a "revolving door" parole system worsened in the aftermath of
Furman with an increased fear of the paroling of violent murderers,
and prompted legislative response. Alabama was a harbinger of the cur-
rent national mood and moved quickly to legislate LWOP in the post-
Furman era.127 Alabama's present capital sentencing scheme went into
effect in 1975, and as of March 1987, 109 inmates were serving life-
without-parole sentences for capital murder convictions. 28 In March
1989 the estimated total was 133 inmates out of a total prison popula-
tion of nearly 13,000.129
According to Assistant Alabama Attorney General Ed Carnes, life-
without-parole works well in Alabama and is viewed as a beneficial sen-
tencing alternative by professionals in virtually all segments of the
126. Carnes Interview, supra note 3; see also supra note 5 (describing parole procedures in
Alabama).
127. National opinion polls generally reflect a steady increase in the percentage of Americans
who feel that the courts do not deal harshly enough with criminals. See Cheatwood, supra note 16,
at 43. This feeling certainly is evident in Tennessee. See, e.g., Loggins, Victims Call for Tougher
Punishment, Tennessean, Feb. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 1. For Alabama's specific legislative action, see
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1975).
128. Carnes Interview, supra note 3. In 1987 the Alabama Attorney General's Office con-
ducted an extensive survey to determine that of the 408 inmates serving LWOP in Alabama, 109
(27%) were incarcerated for capital murder convictions while 299 (73%) were imprisoned as habit-
ual offenders. See Memorandum from Reginald Aguilar to Ed Carnes (Mar. 2, 1987) (on file with
the Alabama Attorney General's Office and the Author).
129. Carnes Interview, supra note 3. This figure was obtained by applying the 27% figure
from above to the latest available population totals from Alabama's Department of Corrections.
See DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF ALA., MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT Jan. 1989, at 6 (available
from the State of Alabama).
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criminal justice system. 130 Prosecutors favor it as a meaningful and ap-
propriate punishment alternative for violent criminals that society does
not want released. LWOP also provides district attorneys with an addi-
tional prosecutorial weapon in Alabama, and lengthy trials may be
avoided if a murderer plea bargains for life-without-parole instead of
risking the death penalty at trial.13' Even defense attorneys acknowl-
edge the penalty's usefulness in restoring the public's faith in the effi-
cacy of the criminal justice system and generally view LWOP as a
means to reduce the number of individuals sentenced to death."3 2 Be-
cause Alabama adopted life-without-parole for capital murderers to iso-
late them from society, any consideration of moving to a triple tiered
scheme that also offers regular life as a sentencing alternative appears
precluded.133
To critics134 who assert that life-without-parole contributes to
prison overcrowding and strains discipline, supporters of LWOP re-
spond with common sense and facts. A penalty that has resulted in less
than 150 incarcerations in a system that routinely incarcerates nearly
13,000 hardly appears to be a leading cause of prison overpopulation. 135
Additionally, if prisons are to be filled to capacity, murderers are ex-
actly the kind of violent offenders who ought to fill prisons.' Some
prison officials maintain that LWOP inmates are inevitable discipline
problems because the "carrot" of parole cannot be used as an incentive
for good behavior.137 Others disagree. In Alabama LWOP inmates com-
mit fifty percent fewer reported disciplinary offenses per capita than all
other types of inmates combined."'R Prison privileges and in-house pun-
130. Carnes Interview, supra note 3.
131. Telephone Interview with Robert Field, District Attorney for the Seventh Judicial Dis-
trict of Alabama (Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Field Interview]. Mr. Field recounted several cases
arising in Anniston, Alabama in which defendants in effect had pled to LWOP, including a brutal
case in which two defendants were charged with capital murder, and one pled to LWOP while the
other took his chances at trial and was sentenced to death despite a jury's recommendation of
LWOP. Id.
132. Carnes Interview, supra note 3. Mr. Field, however, would dispute this opinion and
maintains that many criminals are sentenced to death anyway and that LWOP does not make that
much of a difference. See Field Interview, supra note 131.
133. Carnes Interview, supra note 3 (stating that "if it's not broken, don't fix it").
134. Generally, critics of LWOP in Alabama make complaints based on the numbers of ha-
bitual offender inmates serving life-without-parole (73% of the LWOP population) and not capital
murderers. See, e.g., Hamburg & Hodges, Life-Without-Parole Law Strains Prison Costs, Hurts
DiScipline, Birmingham Post-Herald, Jan. 21, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
135. See zupra note 129 and accompanying text.
136. As Assistant Alabama Attorney General Carnes puts it, why moan about filling prisons
with violent murderers when "that's who your prisons ought to be filled with." Stewart & Lieber-
man, supra note 2, at 16. Mr. Carnes reiterated this view in 1989. Carnes Interview, supra note 3.
137. See, e.g., Hamburg & Hodges, supra note 134, at Al, col. 2, A6, col 1 (comments of Mr.
Fred Smith, former Alabama Department of Corrections commissioner).
138. Telephone Interview with Dr. Miriam Schinbaum, Director of Classification. Alabama
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ishments seem to discipline LWOP inmates adequately in Alabama.
Opponents of life-without-parole in Alabama primarily are the in-
mates serving it.' Convicted murderer and LWOP inmate Ted McGin-
nis decries the harshness of his sentence, but still hopes that one day he
will be released. 40 Any chance of release from a life-without-parole sen-
tence in Alabama is slim, however, and the courts ensure that the
state's prosecutors stress this fact during sentencing proceedings.
LWOP's definiteness is its greatest strength in Alabama. A murderer
incarcerated- for life-without-parole will spend the rest of his natural
life in an Alabama prison.
Unlike most states' chief executives, the Governor of Alabama may
not commute life-without-parole sentences or pardon any criminal of-
fenders.' The Alabama Supreme Court requires jurors to be instructed
that life-without-parole means precisely what it says, nothing more and
nothing less. 42 Life-without-parole for capital murderers in Alabama is
a popular, effective penalty option that appears to have formidable sup-
Department of Corrections (Mar. 7, 1989) [hereinafter Schinbaum Interview]. Dr. Schinbaum ac-
knowledges that LWOP inmates tend to commit more serious infractions, assaults as opposed to
insubordination, but stresses that they commit half the discipline violations in general of other
inmates, and as a whole are not a discipline problem. Id. In-house punishments for LWOP inmates
do tend to be more strict than those for ordinary inmates.
139. Carnes Interview, supra note 3. Carnes states that "they hate it with a passion." Id.
140. Inmate Keeps His Store of Hope Alive, Birmingham Post-Herald, Jan. 21, 1983, at 1B,
col. 4. McGinnis, at Holman after being convicted of a stabbing murder committed during a rob-
bery, commented: "All I see every day is [sic] hate, confusion, people hanging themselves, lying in
bed with one another, raping one another .... You have to adjust to keep from going crazy. You
just have to accept things." Id.; see also McGinnis v. State, 443 So. 2d 1289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
141. Carnes Interview, supra note 3; see Brown v. State, 288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971);
ALA. CONST. amend. XXXVIII § 124 (governor may only commute death sentences); see also Mar-
tin, supra note 50, at 597. The federal government and 46 states allow the chief executive to com-
mute life-without-parole sentences to provide potentially for inmates to be released on parole. Id.
at 595. South Carolina provides the same limited power as Alabama, and Vermont and Rhode
Island have no constitutional provision at all for commutation. Id.; see also Cheatwood, supra note
16, at 48-50; supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Normally, commutation is an option that
always can be held out to LWOP inmates and provides a release mechanism in crises or special
circumstances, and some states mention this possibility specifically in their LWOP statutes. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 1979) (stating that "no [LWOP inmate] shall be released on
parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of years"). Some states painstakingly
eliminate any possibility of release on any other grounds except commutation. See, e.g., WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(1) (Supp. 1989); see also Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 49. Hence only
in a very few jurisdictions-Alabama, Rhode Island, perhaps Vermont, and more infrequently
South Carolina-can a murderer be put behind bars with no potential release mechanisms of any
kind under a life-without-parole sentence.
142. Ex parte Rutledge, 482 So. 2d 1262, 1264-65 (Ala. 1984). Specifically, a prosecutor had
argued that "as long as there are parole boards, as long as there are Federal courts in the state of
Alabama, and as long as the legislature of the State of Alabama still exists, there is a chance that
this defendant will get out. . . ." Id. at 1264. The court held that this argument "exceeds the
permissible boundaries" of Alabama law and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. Id.
at 1264-65.
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port into the foreseeable future.
B. Kentucky's Triple or Quadruple Tiered Approach
The Commonwealth of Kentucky employs a unique capital sen-
tencing scheme that borrows from a variety of approaches. Upon con-
viction of a capital offense in Kentucky, punishment may take one of
four forms: (1) a death sentence; (2) a term of imprisonment for life
without probation or parole until the service of a minimum of twenty-
five years; (3) a sentence for life; or (4) a term of years for at least
twenty years.'4" Prior to 1986, this system functioned in practice as a
triple tiered system with very few capital murderers receiving a sen-
tence for a term of years. 144 In 1986 the Kentucky legislature passed a
Truth in Sentencing Act specifically to increase the amounts of time
that violent offenders would spend in Kentucky prisons. The Act re-
quires that a violent offender convicted of a "Class A" felony and sen-
tenced to a term of years serve at least one half of the imposed
sentence.
4 5
The Truth in Sentencing Act raises the possibility that sentencers
who want to incarcerate violent murderers for long periods of time sim-
ply can impose sentences of lengthy terms of years and bypass Ken-
tucky's life-without-parole for twenty-five years sanction. A sentence
for a term of sixty years, for example, would guarantee incarceration for
at least thirty years and be more severe than LWOP-25. As of March
1989, the Kentucky Corrections Cabinet housed fifty-eight inmates con-
victed of murder who were serving sentences under the Truth in Sen-
tencing Act ranging from twenty years to regular life to 180 years.146
Since Kentucky's passage of life-without-parole for twenty-five years as
a capital sentencing option in 1984, only thirty inmates have been in-
143. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.030(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); see Commonwealth v.
Tiryung, 709 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1986).
144. Tustaniwsky Interview, supra note 83. This reluctance to sentence violent murderers to
terms of years probably stemmed directly from the knowledge that under Kentucky's parole stat-
utes before 1986, all inmates serving terms of years were to be considered for parole after a maxi-
mum of eight years. Interview with William Clark, Kentucky Corrections Cabinet (Apr. 4, 1989)
[hereinafter Clark Interview]. The reality of Kentucky's practice arguably warrants designating
Kentucky's system as "triple tiered," despite its four alternative sentences.
145. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401(3) (Michie]Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). The Act pro-
vides that inmates serving regular life sentences for capital offenses must serve at least 12 years in
a penitentiary. Id. § 439.3401(2).
146. Clark Interview, supra note 144 (statistics obtained from the Kentucky Corrections
Cabinet for Dec. 16, 1988, and on file with the Author). The inmate sentenced in 1987 to serve 180
years for murder will not be eligible for parole until Feb. 2, 2078. Id. Another inmate sentenced to
150 years for murder in 1988 is not eligible for parole until Sept. 30, 2062. Id. They are in prison
for the rest of their natural lives without benefit of probation or parole whatever the specific name
of the sentence.
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carcerated under the sentence. 47 These statistics indicate that since
1986 Kentucky has moved from effectively a triple tiered scheme to im-
plementation of a very real quadruple tiered approach that allows for
lengthy prison sentences without parole in two different ways.
This unique approach did not result from any type of legislative
plan. Rather, the Kentucky legislature has adapted its capital sentenc-
ing scheme-starting with death, regular life, and terms of years alter-
natives and adding LWOP-25 and tougher parole laws-as
circumstances have deemed necessary. 148 The result is a catalog of sen-
tencing alternatives that is advantageously flexible, politically sound,
and pleasing to several constituency groups. 49
Prior to the adoption of life-without-parole for twenty-five years,
uncertainty regarding what a life sentence actually meant caused dis-
satisfaction in Kentucky. The rape and murder of a student in 1983 by
a convicted murderer who was out of prison on parole after serving only
eight years of his term highlighted the frustration.150 A twenty-five year
cap on life-without-parole was proposed in 1984 because this length of
time would incarcerate most violent murderers during the range of ages
in which they are considered most dangerous. 151 The cap also provides a
release mechanism to prevent a continual backlog of life-without-parole
inmates. In addition, Kentucky's Governor may commute any sentence,
including LWOP-25 and lengthy terms of years, to a shorter term of
years to provide for parole eligibility. 1 2 In certain situations Kentucky's
executive also can attach specific conditions to a commuted sentence to
require completion of the sentence without eligibility for parole. 15 3
Most professionals in Kentucky's criminal justice system favor the
multitiered capital sentencing scheme and the flexibility it provides.
Both life-without-parole for twenty-five years and a long Truth in Sen-
tencing term of years provide a sanction that is tougher than a regular
147. Id.
148. Interview with Dr. Deborah Wilson, Policy Advisor, Office of the Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Kentucky (Apr. 7, 1989) [hereinafter Wilson Interview].
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. According to Dr. Wilson, most violent murderers in Kentucky are between the ages of
19 and 34. A mandatory 25-year sentence would incarcerate these persons until they were between
44 and 59, a statistically much safer range of ages. Id.
152. Ky. CONST. § 77 (providing the executive with the power to commute any sentence ex-
cept in cases of impeachment or treason); see, e.g., Wooden v. Goheen, 255 S.W.2d 1000 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1953) (recognizing power of executive to commute, reprieve, and pardon); see also Martin,
supra note 47, at 597 (containing a state by state comparison of commutation provisions).
153. See Hamilton v. Ford, 362 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (holding that the executive
could commute a death sentence to a life term without parole even though the only capital sen-
tencing options at the time were death or regular life).
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life sentence, yet not as final or as irreversible as the death penalty. 54
Prosecutors favor Kentucky's version of life-without-parole because it
allows for a tailoring of punishment to fit each crime. A case with fewer
aggravating circumstances or more mitigating circumstances can be
concluded with an LWOP-25 sentence that will not risk reversal on ap-
peal. 1 55 The different alternatives also provide for a variety of plea-bar-
gaining opportunities. 5 6
Defense counsel in Kentucky generally favor life-without-parole as
a means of keeping defendants off death row.157 Some defense attor-
neys, however, maintain that LWOP-25 does not prevent death row
convictions but only expands the possibilities for longer prison
sentences. A capital murderer with several mitigating factors in his or
her case who before 1984 would have received a regular life sentence
now may receive life-without-parole for twenty-five years.' 58 Instead of
saving lives, the sanction toughens the sentences of criminals who
would not have received the death penalty under the sentencing struc-
ture prior to 1984.
As a group, however, only prison officials in Kentucky seem unsup-
portive of life-without-parole. While Corrections Cabinet officials main-
tain that inmates become greater security risks the longer they are in
prison, no specific examples exist of LWOP inmates posing any more of
a security threat than any other type of inmate. 159 Out of a prison pop-
ulation of over seven thousand, only thirty currently are serving life-
without-parole for twenty-five years and another fifty-eight have been
sentenced under lengthy Truth in Sentencing terms. 60 The numbers
alone do not indicate a massive overcrowding problem.
From the corrections perspective, the greater threat is the unknown
effects of LWOP. With an average of six new inmates each year serving
LWOP-25, a set of approximately 150 inmates eventually will occupy
bedspace in Kentucky's crowded prisons for 365 days a year. Even this
number restricts what the Corrections Cabinet can do in relieving over-
crowding and planning for future prison populations. The medical and
154. Wilson Interview, supra note 148.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. This view is shared by defense counsel working in capital litigation in Kentucky.
Telephone Interview with Kathleen Kallaher, Assistant Director, Kentucky Capital Litigation Re-
source Center (Apr. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Kallaher Interview]. Kallaher also points out that
LWOP-25 is "an extra thing to argue for in a plea bargain, especially for an older defendant." Id.
She adds that often the hardest aspect of settlement negotiations is "talking [the defendant] into
accepting a guaranteed 25 year sentence." Id.
158. Kallaher Interview, supra note 157.
159. Clark Interview, supra note 144.
160. Ky. CORRECTIONS CABINET, WEEKLY POPULATION SUMMARY (Mar. 31, 1989) (obtained dur-
ing Clark Interview, supra note 144 and on file with the Author).
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psychological needs of the LWOP inmates prior to their releases are
also unknown.161 Additionally, the possibility of a larger influx of long-
term and natural life inmates from the Commonwealth's Truth in Sen-
tencing provisions could create unprecedented overcrowding problems
for which Kentucky has not adequately planned or prepared. 162
Despite its uncertainty, life-without-parole in whatever form gener-
ally is considered a success in Kentucky. The prosecutorial advantages
and the public's perception of a meaningful alternative to death in capi-
tal cases outweigh the fears concerning the sanction's eventual effect on
the Commonwealth's correctional facilities. Because of the prevailing
political conditions and the variety of sentencing alternatives in place,
little chance exists that Kentucky's capital sentencing scheme will be
altered in the foreseeable future.
V. BENEFITS, PROBLEMS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF LIFE-WITHOUT-
PAROLE
Most Americans favor use of the death penalty to punish violent
murderers and protect society.163 At least one retired Supreme Court
Justice and the Ad Hoc Committee he chaired, however, acknowledge
that the current system of applying capital punishment prevents the
sanction from accomplishing its intended purposes of punishment, ret-
ribution, and deterrence.6 The idealized concept of swiftly eliminating
those who do not respect human life and sending a clear message of
absolute punishment to deter potential murderers simply is not mani-
fested in any present American capital sentencing scheme.165
161. Wilson Interview, supra note 148.
162. Id. Long-range planning may start in the aftermath of the Truth in Sentencing Act to
deal with an ever growing, ever aging prison population. Id. Interestingly, Kentucky still incarcer-
ates eight men under life-without-parole for convictions under an old child rape statute. Clark
Interview, supra note 144. That statute was repealed in the early 1970s, but no study has been
attempted to determine the effects of LWOP incarceration on this group at the Kentucky State
Penitentiary at Eddyville. Wilson Interview, supra note 148.
163. According to the Gallup Poll, as many as 80% of Americans favor capital punishment
for murderers. See Malcolm, Capital Punishment Is Popular, but So Are Its Alternatives, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at E4, col. 1; see also American Survey: Capital Punishment, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 19, 1988, at 23, 26 (citing a 1986 Gallup Poll indicating that approximately 70% of Americans
favor capital punishment).
164. See Powell, supra note 9, at 1035, 1041-42; see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
AD Hoc COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 2-5
(1989) [hereinafter POWELL COMMITTEE], reprinted in Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases,
45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239, 3239-40 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Report on Habeas Corpus].
165. Columbia Law School Professor Jack Greenberg probably best describes the American
system of capital punishment:
Since at least 1967, the death penalty has been inflicted only rarely, erratically, and often
upon the least odious killers, while many of the most heinous criminals have escaped execu-
tion. Moreover, it has been employed almost exclusively in a few formerly slaveholding states,
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Although most Americans cling to a favorable view of capital pun-
ishment, some polls indicate that the realities of "only" 121 executions
since 1973 and of 2210 inmates crowding death rows with numerous and
costly appeals and stays of execution at various judicial stages have
opened American minds to the possibilities of alternatives to capital
punishment.""6 A Gallup poll demonstrates that nationwide support for
the death penalty dropped from seventy-two percent to fifty-five per-
cent when respondents were told of the alternative of life-without-
parole. 16
7
In Georgia, which has the fourth highest total of executions since
Furman,6e a Georgia State University poll indicated that fifty-three
percent of Georgians surveyed would vote to abolish the death penalty
if state law provided for a murder sentence of life-without-parole for at
least twenty-five years, combined with some type of restitution pro-
gram."6 9 Even in Florida, the state described as showing that it can exe-
cute almost any death row inmate that it wants,17 0 fifty-four percent of
persons surveyed by Amnesty International said that they would be less
likely to support capital punishment if assured that dangerous murder-
ers would be imprisoned for life with no chance for parole.171 Similar
results are seen in a survey in Nebraska. Fifty-eight percent of Nebras-
kans polled favor the abolition of capital punishment if the alternatives
of LWOP-25 and a restitution program are offered. 172
As Americans attempt to control violent crime, life-without-parole
offers an additional weapon for criminal justice systems' arsenals, whose
big gun of capital punishment shows a marked tendency to misfire or
shoot blanks. Americans are recognizing that alternatives to capital
punishment are needed to control the increasing number of violent
murders. Life-without-parole is an alternative that seems capable of ac-
and there it has been used almost exclusively against killers of whites, not blacks, and never
against white killers of blacks.
Greenberg, supra note 9, at 1670; see also Greenberg, Capital Punishment As a System, 91 YALE
L.J. 908 (1982).
166. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (July 1989 & Execu-
tion Update Jan. 18, 1990) [hereinafter DEATH Row, U.SA.].
167. Gallup Reports 244 & 255, Jan./Feb. 1986, at 10-16.
168. DEATH Row, U.SA, supra note 166, at 3 (stating that 14 executions have occurred since
1973 and that there are 102 persons on death row in Georgia).
169. R. THOMAS & J. HUTCHESON, CENTER FOR PUBLIC & URBAN RESEARCH, COLLEGE OF PUBLIC
& URBAN AFFAIRS, GA. STATE UNIV., GEORGIA RESIDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY,
THE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS, AND RELATED ISSUES (Dec. 1986) (prepared for the
Clearinghouse on Georgia Prisons and Jails).
170. Greenberg, supra note 9, at 1674.
171. CAMBRIDGE SURVEY RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TowARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN FLORIDA 18 (June 1985) (a public opinion survey prepared for Amnesty International).
172. BUREAU OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH AT THE UNIV. OF NEB.-Lincoln, THE NEBRASKA AN-
NUAL SOCIAL INDICATORS SURVEY (Jan. 1988) (prepared by David R. Johnson and Alan Booth).
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cruing several important philosophical and practical advantages.
A. Potential Benefits of Life-Without-Parole
1. A Surer Penalty in Many Cases
Since 1973, 121 people have been executed legally in the United
States, but nearly 4000 have been sentenced to die during that time." 3
During the lengthy interim between issuance of a death sentence and
the fulfillment of the penalty, statistics show that a number of incidents
may affect a defendant. Since 1973, twenty-seven death row inmates
have committed suicide, and forty-four have died, not from execution,
but from natural causes, in escape attempts, or murder. 17 4 Fifty-one
death sentences have been commuted, while 559 sentences have been
vacated because of unconstitutional statutes.17 5 Another 935 sentences
or convictions were reversed on other grounds. 176 Over 2000 inmates
still await death, but the odds actually favor that the inmates will not
die in a legal execution.
Justice Powell, the Ad Hoc Committee, and proponents of capital
punishment in general attribute the lengthy delays and low number of
executions to the United States' unique system of dual collateral review
of criminal convictions. Automatic state reviews of death sentences
and lengthy habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts increase the
span between the imposition and execution of a death sentence, thus
increasing the chances that a murderer will not be executed. In Powell's
opinion, the dual system invites abuse and undermines public confi-
dence in the criminal justice system.'7 8 This elaborate, lengthy, and ex-
pensive system exists, however, because of the unique finality of the
death penalty and the need to eliminate as much error or hint of injus-
tice as possible before taking a human life.
The current system effects a death penalty that is frequently im-
posed but rarely carried out-a punishment that is hardly swift and
certainly not sure. Life-without-parole for violent murderers often
would eliminate both of these problems. Imposition of life-without-pa-
role avoids costly appeals routinely invoked in death sentences. A life-
without-parole sentence means exactly what it says in the charge to a
173. DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 166, at 1 (3941 persons sentenced to die).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Powell, supra note 9, at 1038; POWELL COMMrrrEE, supra note 164, at 2-3, reprinted
in Report on Habeas Corpus, supra note 164, at 3239. Justice Powell personally opposes the con-
cept of capital punishment, but believes it to be constitutionally permissible. See Powell, supra
note 9, at 1045.
178. Powell, supra note 9, at 1041.
556 [Vol. 43:529
LIFE- WITHOUT-PAROLE
jury, and except in the very unusual instance of an executive commuta-
tion, a criminal justice system can guarantee that LWOP will protect
society from a violent murderer for the rest of that murderer's life.
All too often, at least in the public's perception, federal courts and
lawyers manipulate death statutes and frustrate attempts to impose
capital punishment. Appeals and stays of execution undermine public
faith in the criminal justice system.1 9 Because life-without-parole does
not invoke the finality of capital punishment, repeated appeal opportu-
nities are not as imperative. Further, because life-without-parole has
been sanctioned constitutionally,'8" and because the states retain the
prerogative to determine the lengths of sentences, numerous constitu-
tional issues that might be appealed are eliminated. Life-without-parole
offers an alternative to capital punishment that would punish murder-
ers exactly as jurors and the general public expect them to be punished,
a much surer sanction actually than the death penalty.
2. The Preservation of Human Life?
Society contends that it is wrong to take another human life in a
premeditated fashion. Yet, in a very premeditated fashion, society takes
the lives of some of those who kill. At best, capital punishment sends
mixed signals. George Bernard Shaw said of the death penalty: "It is
the worst form of assassination because it is invested with the approval
of society. Murder and capital punishment are not opposites which can-
cel one another-but similar."' 8'
179. See POWELL COMMrrrEE, supra note 164, at 1, reprinted in Report on Habeas Corpus,
supra note 164, at 3239. To understand the public's perception of the federal judiciary's role in
thwarting capital punishment, consider Justice William Brennan's remarks: "'When the penalty is
death, we, like state court judges, are tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the
law in order to give a doubtfully condemned man another chance.'" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 287 n.34 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196
(1953)).
180. See supra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
181. E. BLOCK, AND MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: THE CASE AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 165
(1962). This Note does not attempt to develop an argument that capital punishment "brutalizes"
society. Commentators far more experienced have already made the argument. See, e.g., W. Bow-
ERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 271-336 (1984). Fundamen-
tally, however, it appears illogical to use capital punishment to preserve the sanctity of human life
when the punishment actually destroys the end being sought. The faith of the Quakers and the
logic of Thomas Jefferson best respond to critics who would maintain that criminals who murder
have surrendered their right to life. The Religious Society of Friends maintains:
[I]t is as much forbidden to society organized as government to deprive a human creature of
life, as it is forbidden the individual to do so. We hold that life, given to us by our [Creator],
to be sacred and hence not to be taken from any of us by the judgment of [humans] . ...
E. BLOCK, supra, at 161-62. Jefferson opposed capital punishment and said that he would do so
"until I have the infallibility of human judgment demonstrated to me." Id. at 1. The quote also has
been attributed to the Marquis de Lafeyette.
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To critics who claim that capital punishment is necessary to deter
murderers, protect society, and provide retribution, life-without-parole
offers an alternative that accomplishes these tasks without the moral
cost of taking more lives. Capital punishment is disrespectful of the
sanctity of human life, but so is paroling the murderers who have shown
the ultimate disrespect for human life.18 2 Life-without-parole offers an
alternative that clearly demonstrates commitment both to nonviolence
and the basic sanctity of human life. Alabama's case of Raymond Eu-
gene Brown demonstrates that life-without-parole can save the lives of
both guilty murderers and innocent members of society.183
Additionally, life-without-parole inherently preserves the innocent
lives of those who have been convicted unjustly for murder. Opponents
of the death penalty frequently argue that innocent persons may be
killed however elaborate the appeals process. Indeed, the unjust deaths
of innocents that society has condemned are well chronicled. 184 With
life-without-parole, even though years spent behind bars cannot be re-
turned, an error is not made at such a high cost. Life is preserved for
the unjustly incarcerated inmate through life-without-parole.
Critics may argue that although life-without-parole could save a
handful of lives, the costs of supporting prisoners for life would be too
great. Yet, in addition to saving lives, life-without-parole is shown to
save money. Experts conservatively estimate that millions of dollars are
required to process and appeal a death penalty to its conclusion, but
inmates generally can be housed for life at an average cost of less than
one million dollars. 85 In Florida alone, court costs, attorney's fees, and
incarceration of a death row inmate cost approximately 3.2 million dol-
lars, while the state currently can incarcerate a criminal for life for
700,000 dollars.""
182. See Brill, supra note 14, at 3. Brill further states:
A society that paroles a slasher-rapist after serving eight years, or writes a law that makes it
conceivable that one morning I could bump into Sirhan Sirhan in an elevator on his way to
work ("Good morning, Mr. Sirhan how are you today?" "Fine, thanks. And you?") is a society
that's spitting on the sanctity of human life and writing a suicide pact in the process.
Id.
183. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
184. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 21 (1987) (painstakingly outlining 350 examples of innocent persons sentenced in potentially
capital cases in the United States, including 27 since 1976); see also Bedau & Radelet, The Myth
of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1988).
185. See Spangenberg & Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Con-
siderations, 23 Loy. L.A.L. RE V. 45, 47-57 (1989); Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars
and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1221, 1245-66 (1985).
186. See Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth As Expensive, Miami Herald,
July 10, 1988, at 12A, col. 1. Although one cannot put a price on any human life, it is doubtful that
the grim satisfaction of so relatively few executions is worth the staggering financial costs it im-
poses on America's legal system. Furthermore, it must be recognized that tremendous costs can be
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3. An Additional Prosecutorial Tool in Murder Trials
Life-without-parole provides prosecutors with an additional option
in their task of protecting society from violent criminals. The sanction
adds another variable to a judge's or jury's considerations and can alter
the negotiation and litigation between prosecution and defense.1 '7 Life-
without-parole can provide needed leverage for prosecutors to convince
sentencers and the public that just and meaningful penalties for murder
other than capital punishment exist. LWOP also increases the possibil-
ity of a plea-bargaining arrangement that eliminates the need for a
lengthy capital trial.1 88 A clearly guilty defendant may be amenable to a
guilty plea when offered an option other than the electric chair or the
gas chamber. Even life-without-parole inmates seem to decide ulti-
mately that life in some form is superior to the alternative.8 s Regard-
less of defendants' opinions, life-without-parole is an additional tool for
prosecuting murderers and ensures that the murderers are removed
from society for significant lengths of time. In confronting violent crime
in today's society, prosecutors should be given every constitutionally
permissible advantage. 90
B. Problems with the Current Applications of Life- Without-Parole
Despite life-without-parole's advantages, it is not a panacea for the
problems of violent crime or the question of how best to punish mur-
derers. Problems and uncertainties plague the use of life-without-parole
both in its current application by thirty states and in the potential ef-
fect of its large scale implementation on the Nation's criminal justice
and corrections systems. The following sections explore these current
problems and potential effects.
1. Relatively Little Use of the Sanction in Capital Cases
Perhaps the most telling criticism of life-without-parole, especially
in states that use LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty, is that
LWOP simply is not used often enough to make any real difference.
The low numbers of life-without-parole inmates in Alabama and Ken-
incurred by a system which incarcerates many inmates for their natural lives and still has the
death penalty with all of its attendant costs as well.
187. Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 51-52.
188. Carnes Interview, supra note 3; Field Interview, supra note 135; Kallaher Interview,
supra note 160; Wilson Interview, supra note 148.
189. Kallaher Interview, supra note 160; see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
190. Nevada Deputy Attorney General John Mayer summarizes the opinion of many prose-
cutors who support LWOP by stating that "[life-without-parole] is beneficial because it places
[violent offenders] in an atmosphere where it limits the persons they can hurt." Stewart & Lieber-
man, supra note 2, at 17.
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tucky relative to both convicted murderers and overall prison popula-
tions demonstrate a reluctance on the part of juries and judges to
impose the sanction in place of capital punishment in heinous cases. 191
Caught between public perception that "life" sentences do not mean
life imprisonment and that a sentence of death may never be carried
out because of "crafty lawyers" and a lenient federal appeals system,
jurors may vote to impose the death penalty merely in hopes of keeping
murderers behind bars during a tortuous, protracted appellate process
that may be longer than a parole-eligible "life" sentence.192
Life-without-parole statutes can incarcerate violent murderers and
protect society without legitimizing death in any form. Many citizens,
however, remain unaware of how life-without-parole statutes are ap-
plied, where the statutes exist, and exactly what they mean. Jurors who
cannot be apprised of parole procedures in most capital cases hardly
can be expected to apply, with very little knowledge, a relatively new
sentence when the more familiar death sentence, even with its
problems, remains an alternative."' The infrequent application of life-
without-parole will persist as long as the public remains unaware of
death penalty alternatives. Once legislators and judges permit jurors a
clear understanding of parole law and capital sentencing alternatives
like LWOP, juries may be less reticent to apply the life-without-parole
sanctions already in place.194
2. A Lack of Information in General
Any hope for progress in educating politicians and the public about
life-without-parole must be tempered by the realization that little is
known formally about the sanction. Only two published articles specifi-
cally address life-without-parole, 95 and no studies have been done to
address several crucial questions pertaining to LWOP.
191. See supra notes 129, 160, and accompanying text.
192. See Paduano & Smith, supra note 47, at 212-13; see also Tabak, The Death of Fairness:
The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 797, 819-20 (1986). American criminal justice and political systems seem to have a
knee-jerk reaction about equating being tough on violent crime with supporting capital punish-
ment. Such a reaction certainly did not hinder George Bush's prospects in the 1988 election when
he attacked Michael Dukakis for being "soft on crime" and highlighted the Massachusetts Demo-
crat's opposition to the death penalty. Cohen, Politicians, Voters and Voltage, TIME, Feb. 13,
1989, at 96.
193. See Paduano & Smith, supra note 47, at 214-20.
194. Once politicians cease relying on capital punishment to demonstrate their toughness
and see that other "tough" measures against violent crime are not only possible but also more
effective, perhaps other states and the federal government will adopt and use life-without-parole in
their capital sentencing schemes. See Berg, As Violence Soars, Death Penalty Gains Favor, but
Does It Really Deter Crime?, Minneapolis Star Tribune, June 1, 1989, at 10A, col. 1.
195. Cheatwood, supra note 16; Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2.
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For example, in states that let jurors choose life-without-parole as a
sentencing option in first degree or capital murder trials, what factors
do jurors consider determinative when choosing between LWOP and
the death penalty? No polling studies have been done. What circum-
stances led to the passage of the LWOP legislation in the specific states
that have life-without-parole as an alternative to the death penalty? No
formal studies have been done. What are the effects of incarcerating
someone for forty, fifty, even sixty years? In an era in which "long-
term" incarceration is accepted as seven years, the physical and psycho-
logical effects of true long-term incarceration simply are not known.19
Studies in this area are crucial to determine if life-without-parole could
or should be an important development in fighting violent crime.
C. Future Implications
Potential problems of life-without-parole are used consistently as
arguments against its widespread implementation. Opponents of the
sanction maintain that LWOP will create massive overcrowding and
that this growing prison population will age behind bars, further bur-
dening taxpayers because of the costs of illness and infirmity. Others
claim that life-without-parole will destroy discipline in prisons and that
prisoners without hope of release will become uncontrollable and disre-
spectful of authority. While planning for these effects is essential, cur-
rent evidence indicates that only the expense of an aging prison
population looms as a real threat, and that this threat can be
minimized.
1. Problems for Prison Overcrowding
The federal government demands that prisons shall not be over-
crowded. The fears that life-without-parole inmates will "fill up" all ex-
isting prisons, and that states will not build enough prisons to meet
their needs, however, have not come to fruition. Experiences in Ala-
196. Wilson & Vito, Long-Term Inmates: Special Needs and Management Considerations,
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1988, at 21. As the average time served by inmates released from state
correctional facilities is 24.8 months according to a 1986 study, the seven-year period has been
accepted by most scholars as distinguishing a "long-term" inmate. Id. But see id. at 23-24.
Professor Derral Cheatwood outlines an excellent research agenda for increasing knowledge
about life-without-parole. He advocates study in the areas of what social and political processes
lead to passage of life-without-parole statutes; LWOP's effects on crime rates, prosecutorial offices,
and corrections systems; and conducting such studies in particular states and across longitudinal
state lines. Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 56-57. Regarding life-without-parole just as a capital
sentencing option, it would be enlightening to poll jurors about their reasons for choosing or not
choosing life-without-parole over the death penalty or regular life sentences, and to conduct stud-
ies on LWOP inmates (such as the eight men in Kentucky, see supra note 162) to gauge the effects
of their incarceration.
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bama and Kentucky seem to indicate that life-without-parole inmates
do not risk overcrowding the Nation's prisons. Murderers serving life-
without-parole comprise less than one-and-one-half percent of Ala-
bama's entire prison population. 19 7 LWOP-25 and lengthy Truth in
Sentencing inmates constitute less than two percent of Kentucky's
prison population, with LWOP-25 inmates alone comprising less than
one half of one percent.98 Although these percentages will increase if
life-without-parole sentences are issued more frequently, and although
the existing low percentages nevertheless restrict prison officials' alter-
natives in reducing prison overcrowding, the figures nevertheless indi-
cate that significant flexibility remains in incarcerating or paroling less
violent criminals who have not committed murder.
If a prison system should incarcerate anyone, violent murderers
surely must rank at the top of the list. If prisons are full, then violent
murderers are exactly who should be imprisoned. Society must decide
the proper balance between the financial costs of building and running
needed prisons and the social costs of doing without them. The millions
of dollars that potentially could be saved by avoiding lengthy capital
punishment appeals probably would build a substantial number of pris-
ons or fund the development of alternatives to incarceration for less
violent offenders.' Income earned by life-without-parole inmates
working within a prison system also could augment that system's build-
ing or incarceration alternatives budget.
Additionally, executive commutation exists as a potential release
mechanism that could relieve prison overcrowding in extreme situations
by providing release for life-without-parole inmates. Several states pres-
ently use commutation to reduce prison populations. 00 At least one
commentator believes that as long as life-without-parole penalties are
commuted quietly in limited numbers after twenty or more years, the
public will not protest commutation.20 1 The availability and acceptance
of commutation as a way for states20 2 to relieve prison overcrowding
bolsters the potential effectiveness of life-without-parole.
2. An Ever-Aging Prison Population
By incarcerating violent murderers for the rest of their natural
lives, a life-without-parole sanction guarantees that these prisoners will
197. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
200. Martin, supra note 47, at 604-05 (Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming).
201. Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 50.
202. All states permit commutation except Alabama, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Ver-
mont. See supra note 141.
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age and die in prison. Indeed, this result is one of the penalty's primary
objectives. Critics of life-without-parole, however, maintain that this
goal eventually only overburdens the state with elderly inmates. 03 The
states would have to pay the costs of providing proper medical treat-
ment for these inmates.20 4
The needs of elderly inmates are generally much greater than those
of the younger, average inmate population. The elderly have more
chronic health problems.205 They require expensive medication and
often fill all available bed space in small hospital or infirmary facili-
ties. 206 They often require housing that is accessible to the physically
handicapped 20 7 and need specialized recreation, education, and work
programs. 20 s The elderly require greater protection from victimization
from other inmates20 and place additional psychological strains on
other inmates and prison staff.210 They are simply old and need to be
treated accordingly, but studies and literature on aged offenders have
failed to develop a comprehensive picture of their needs and how they
could be helped in prison.211
Although the potential problem is substantial and little planning
has been done to meet the eventual need, the problem can be mitigated
and perhaps even circumvented. The commutation of elderly inmates'
sentences would enable corrections departments to avoid the costs of
caring for convalescents. Commutation, however, could be socially irre-
sponsible if elderly persons merely were returned to the streets without
adequate provisions to care for themselves.
Life-without-parole sentences that provide for incarceration for a
set minimum of years is another possible solution. Kentucky's LWOP-
25 sanction was passed specifically to incarcerate violent murderers
during their peak years of criminal activity while providing a release
203. In time, thousands of inmates could stockpile in prisons and suffer from ailments rang-
ing from phlebitis to cancer and cataracts to kidney failure. See Stewart & Lieberman, supra note
2, at 17 (remarks of Morris Dees, Director, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Ala.).
204. In time, corrections departments could be running old age homes for toothless and bed-
ridden inmates who in all probability would not, or could not, hurt anyone ever again. Id. (remarks
of Ronald Tate, Spokesperson, Alabama Department of Corrections, Montgomery, Ala., and Mor-
ris Dees).
205. Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 55.
206. See id.
207. Wilson & Vito, supra note 197, at 25.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 55.
211. Chaiklin & Fultz, The Service Needs of Older Offenders, 1 JUST. PROF. 26 (1985); see
also McCarthy, The Health Status of Elderly Inmates, 45 CORRECTIONS TODAY 64 (1983); Morton
& Anderson, Elderly Offenders: The Forgotten Minority, 44 CORRECTIONS TODAY 14 (1982). Dr.
Deborah Wilson believes that the growing length of prison terms, at least in Kentucky, will force
prison officials to address better the needs of elderly inmates. Wilson Interview, supra note 148.
1990] 563
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
mechanism when these inmates no longer pose a heightened threat to
society. 12 If society considers true life-without-parole sentences to be
meaningful and appropriate punishments for murder, society also may
need to think in terms of designing some prisons as "maximum security
convalescent homes. '213
3. Discipline Problems-Creating "Super Inmates"?
The spectre of inmates with nothing to lose acting in total disre-
gard of prison discipline looms as the most frightening consequence of
life-without-parole. Without hope of release through legal means, in-
mates may decide to seek freedom through illegal means-taking hos-
tages, escaping, and rioting. Guards and other persons working in
correctional facilities could be placed in greater personal risk. By re-
moving the correctional incentive of earlier release through good behav-
ior and parole, widespread use of life-without-parole threatens to leave
nothing short of capital punishment as a sanction against dangerous
and disruptive behavior within prisons.
2 14
Many professionals in corrections systems, however, do not share
this pessimistic view of life-without-parole.21 5 While the life-without-
parole inmate has significantly less chance of normal release than other
inmates, maximum security measures already in place in most prisons
can control inmate behavior so that LWOP inmates do not pose a quali-
tatively different security threat than other prisoners.1 6 Measures such
as loss of privileges and isolation are useful in controlling the behavior
of all types of inmates.21 Some experts maintain that life-without-pa-
role inmates actually may be the best behaved inmates in a prison be-
cause they are the most institutionalized. 218  Life-without-parole
inmates may challenge the system for a time, but eventually realize that
their lives are dominated by the prison's structure and adapt accord-
ingly.219 An institutionalized, experienced inmate is not a security risk.
Life-without-parole inmates are not greater security risks and do
212. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
213. Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 55.
214. Even the use of capital punishment against an LWOP inmate who murders another
inmate behind bars cannot be mandatory. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
215. See, e.g., Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2, at 16-17.
216. See generally Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 53-54.
217. Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2, at 16-17 (remarks of Jerry Springborn, Clinical
Services Supervisor, Illinois Department of Corrections).
218. Wilson Interview, supra note 148.
219. Id. Dr. Wilson feels that eventually long-term and life-without-parole inmates become
more involved in a prison's "underground"-its economy, drug trade, social relations, and illegal
gambling. This activity provides the inmates with both outlets for their antiauthority feelings and
a stake in the ongoing, normal operation of the prison that would be disrupted by riots and escape
attempts. Id.
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not cause more discipline problems than other inmates. Life-without-
parole inmates in Alabama commit fifty percent fewer discipline infrac-
tions per capita than other inmates.220 Prisons are obviously more capa-
ble than society in general at securing violent, dangerous persons and
limiting their actions.22'
Although some life-without-parole inmates may not become insti-
tutionalized and indeed become "super inmates, '222 this possibility ex-
ists for all inmates. In two of the worst American prison riots of this
century, Attica in 1971 and New Mexico Prison in 1980, none of the
prisoners involved were serving life-without-parole sentences.2 23 All of
the rioters potentially were eligible for parole, yet they were not in-
duced to respect authority.
Prisons house those most prone to violent acts and those who fail
to respect authority. The current use of life-without-parole does not in-
dicate that LWOP inmates are any more prone to such antisocial be-
havior behind bars than any other type of inmate. Corrections
professionals and prisoners voice legitimate concerns regarding the po-
tential problems of life-without-parole.224 In practice, however, correc-
tions systems have been able to adjust and meet the needs created by
relatively small numbers of life-without-parole inmates. Prisoners like
Harlin Philip Seritt voice threats, but remain behind bars.225
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
For states grappling with both the problems of violent crime and a
public perception that the criminal justice system fails to deal ade-
quately with such crime, life-without-parole appears to offer a viable
alternative. Life-without-parole is a punishment that does exactly what
it says and adds certainty to punishment that the death penalty and
220. Schinbaum Interview, supra note 138; see also Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 54 (re-
marks of Robert Di kover, California Prison System).
221. As Assistant Alabama Attorney General Ed Carnes puts it: "It's a choice between [vio-
lent murderers] committing offenses on the street or giving prison officials a hard time. We're more
concerned with how they behave out on the street." Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2, at 16
(view reiterated in Carnes Interview, supra note 3); see also Cheatwood, supra note 16, at 54.
222. Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2, at 16.
223. At the times of the respective riots, neither New York nor New Mexico had life-without-
parole as a punishment for any crime. See Letter from Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of
the State of Alabama to Birmingham Nzw,: (May IS. 1985) (discussing the St. Claiir pricer riot in
Alabama in which one of seven ringleaders had been serving life-without-parole for being a habit-
ual offender). But see generally Troncale & Bailey, Locked up for Life, Convicts See Nothing to
Lose in Riot, Birmingham News, Apr. 17, 1985, at 1A, col. 1.
224. See, e.g., Stewart & Lieberman, supra note 2, at 39 (remarks of Anthony Travisono,
Executive Director, American Correctional Association, and Vernon Johnson, Alabama LWOP
inmate).
225. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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regular life sentences sorely lack. The Supreme Court and lower courts
have repeatedly affirmed life-without-parole's constitutionality, and a
majority of states have employed life-without-parole in a variety of sen-
tencing schemes. The availability of life-without-parole as punishment
for the most heinous and violent murderers displays both an implacable
hardness against the wanton taking of human life and a sensitivity to
the inherent value of all human life.
Life-without-parole is employed effectively as a prosecutorial
weapon against murder, and potentially saves money and lives-the
lives of convicted murderers who would otherwise languish on death
row as well as the innocent victims of paroled murderers who may kill
again.22 6 These savings entail a cost, however, and incarcerating violent
murderers for the rest of their lives poses some serious problems. If so-
ciety, however, intends to use prisons to incarcerate, isolate, and punish
criminals, then adequate planning and foresight can address potential
overcrowding problems, needs of elderly inmates, and security risks
caused by increased use of LWOP. When compared to the current,
more prevalent practice of sentencing without imposing capital punish-
ment, and the paroling of murderers supposedly serving life sentences,
life-without-parole's philosophical and practical advantages outweigh
its potential problems.
States that currently do not employ life-without-parole punishment
should consider its adoption. A variety of schemes exist for implement-
ing life-without-parole, but the most popular and effective seem to be
those that use LWOP as one option among two or three for punishing
murderers deemed most dangerous and severe. This approach allows
maximum flexibility in tailoring sentences to fit specific crimes and is
easily incorporated into existing sentencing schemes. The triple tiered
approaches recently adopted by Maryland" 7 and Oklahoma228 deserve
continued study and perhaps considerable emulation. To bury life-with-
out-parole in parole statutes defeats the sanction's major advantage: al-
lowing jurors and the public full knowledge concerning the precise
sentence given to a violent murderer. The sanction functions best as
part of a specific sentencing scheme for which a jury may be fully in-
structed, not as an internal mechanism of a corrections system.
Life-without-parole as a punishment for murder should be consid-
ered on its own merits, not in conjunction with LWOP as a punishment
226. The recidivism rates for murderers are generally quite low, however, and most murder-
ers, whatever their penalties, do not kill again. See Marquart & Sorenson, A National Study of the
Furman-Commuted in-mates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 5, 9-10, 22-26 (1989).
227. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (1987).
228. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (West Supp. 1988).
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for habitual offenders or drug kingpins. Much of the public's perception
of the sanction's potential problems stems from its possible, increased
use on criminals other than violent murderers. While these uses are
valid and often may be justified, life-without-parole as a punishment
for murder accrues certain distinct philosophical advantages that are
not shared by the sanction's other uses. Many opponents of capital
punishment will champion life-without-parole as a crucial step toward
abolishing the death penalty. While this argument seems sound in light
of public opinion polls concerning the death penalty, the sanction also
can be used effectively in tandem with capital punishment to benefit
criminal justice systems and to protect citizens from violent criminals.
Life-without-parole should not be seen solely as a stepping stone to
eliminating capital punishment.
For states that are hesitant to adopt life-without-parole on a com-
prehensive scale, more intermediate uses, such as South Carolina's,229
are available. By mandating that all prisoners whose death sentences
are commuted serve life-without-parole, a state ensures that all murder-
ers deemed dangerous enough to kill will not again walk the streets af-
ter an executive commutation. States initially choosing and codifying
this intermediate use of LWOP later may consider its expansion. By
mandating life-without-parole after commutation of a death sentence,
states such as Alabama that already employ life-without-parole for
murderers could tighten their own systems and avoid the potential
irony of a prisoner sentenced to death receiving commutation and sub-
sequent release on parole while a less heinous murderer sentenced to
LWOP remained in prison.
All states that employ or are considering adopting some form of
life-without-parole also should continue to study the sanction's effects
on the criminal justice and corrections systems and on LWOP prisoners
themselves. Extensive additional information is still necessary to mea-
sure adequately the long-term effects of the sanction. Existing informa-
tion, however, indicates that life-without-parole works as an effective
sanction against violent murderers. It protects society better than a
normal life sentence that allows parole and is a swifter and surer pen-
alty in most cases than the death penalty. Life-without-parole is a hard
sanction, consigning individuals to live their natural lives behind bars,
but it accurately reflects society's disdain for the taking of human life.
229. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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Life-without-parole offers a legitimate alternative to capital punish-
ment that provides a small measure of hope to inmates. Life-without-
parole deserves greater use as a sanction against society's worst killers.
Julian H. Wright, Jr.*
* The Author wishes to thank the staff of the Capital Case Resource Center of Tennessee for
their assistance, patience, and support in the writing of this Note. He also wishes to thank his wife,
Amy, for these same contributions and countless others.
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